At this time, as former President Rodrigo Duterte sits detained and faces trial before the International Criminal Courtit’s value remembering — not out of vengeance, however out of readability — the torment he inflicted upon the Filipino folks and what he did to the Philippine Nationwide Police (PNP) within the course of.
On August 15, 2017, in a single sweeping operation, 32 drug suspects have been killed by PNP officers in Bulacan. That day earned the grim distinction of getting the very best variety of deaths in a single day within the drug battle. Dubbed “one time-big time” by the Bulacan Provincial Police, it was praised by president Duterte as an environment friendly implementation of his order. In jest, he mentioned he needed extra “32 deaths a day” like this. And, like clockwork, the police obliged: 26 extra deaths in Manila, 17 in Cavite, 4 in Caloocan, and a couple of in Marikina within the days that adopted.
The police had grow to be the non-public killers of the president. They willingly embraced the function of executioners. The killings have been now not the aberrations of rogue officers; they’d grow to be systematic and systemic. It was now not particular person misconduct — it was institutional engagement. It marked the demise of policing as a career within the Philippines.
And that is what makes the tragedy insufferable. As a result of, earlier than the autumn, there was an ascent.
When the Philippine Public Security Faculty (PPSC) took management of the Philippine Nationwide Police Academy and the Philippine Nationwide Coaching Institute in 1991, the purpose was clear: professionalize the police. The PNPA would mould future commissioned officers by means of a rigorous four-year program. The PNTI would practice non-commissioned officers, requiring a bachelor’s diploma previous to admission. Cadets have been instructed in rule of regulation, due course of, and constitutional rights. They have been mentored in guidelines of engagement, calibrated use of pressure, preservation of forensic proof, lawful investigation strategies.
Persevering with ladderized education schemes have been launched to improve managerial competence and embed benefit within the promotion system. Trendy policing ideas gained traction: group policing, CompStat, problem-oriented policing, good policing, human-rights–primarily based approaches, gender sensitivity, child-friendly procedures, environmental policing. Slowly, painstakingly, younger officers started to suppose in another way. They’d query unlawful orders. They’d resist corruption. They’d aspire to professionalism.
These reforms have been born from a darkish historical past. Throughout Martial Legislation, the police operated with impunity — brutalizing dissenters, serving as henchmen of dictators and native political warlords. The tradition of impunity was deeply ingrained. Submit-EDSA reforms struggled towards it. Political elites — untouched by real transformation — continued to deal with the police as personal armies. Morale remained low. Corruption festered. Human rights abuses by erring officers tainted the whole establishment.
But, regardless of the gargantuan issues, reform was inching ahead. It was imperfect. It was fragile. But it surely was transferring in the precise course.
Then got here Duterte.
As I’ve argued in my earlier writings on noble-cause corruption and the institutional decay of policing, the drug battle didn’t merely goal suspects; it focused the very structure {of professional} policing. Duterte appropriately understood that the police have been weak below the stranglehold of native politicians. However as an alternative of liberating them by means of structural reform — shielding them from patronage, strengthening meritocracy, insulating them from political interference — he provided one thing else: a license to kill.
He appropriately understood that corruption plagued the pressure. But, as an alternative of cleaning it by means of accountability, he weaponized it. He used the identical corrupt officers, using the identical corrupt practices, to eradicate his perceived downside: drug customers.
The long-suffering police officer all of a sudden discovered that means — not in service, not in justice, however in sanctioned violence. Morale soared, nevertheless it was the morale of a mob given state energy. They might now kill a mayor who had as soon as humiliated them. They might eradicate suspects with out paperwork, with out prosecutors, with out courts. And so they might depend on a president who promised immunity.
Instructors on the PPSC, PNPA, and PNTI might solely watch in despair. This was not what they taught. They’d lectured about calibrated pressure; the streets demanded corpses. They’d emphasised preservation of proof; operations have been performed in darkness, with the acquainted script of “fought.” They’d spoken of due course of; due course of was mocked as weak spot.
The highest brass of the PNP confronted a alternative: comply or be transferred to Siberia — figuratively talking. Elevate doubts, and danger being labeled a protector of drug lords. Skilled officers have been cornered: be part of the slaughter or depart the service. Many selected silence. Some selected participation. Just a few selected resignation.
And the general public cheered.
The Filipino folks, pissed off by many years of sluggish courts, porous prosecution, and visual street-level crime, believed this was the rebirth of policing. They noticed motion. They noticed decisiveness. They noticed criminals falling. In my earlier essays on prolonged pretrial detention and systemic inefficiencies, I’ve acknowledged the folks’s frustration with a justice system that strikes at glacial pace. However frustration can not justify perversion.
When the police abandon process, they abandon legitimacy. After they abandon legitimacy, they abandon career. They grow to be an armed group in uniform.
That is the gravest value of the drug battle: not solely the thousands of lives losthowever the corrosion of institutional soul. A career constructed on legality was recast as a equipment of worry. The fragile post-Marcos effort to maneuver from pressure to service, from patronage to professionalism, from impunity to accountability was reversed in a matter of months.
Now Duterte faces trial in The Hague. Historical past has a method of circling again. However trials alone can not resurrect professionalism. The deeper query stays: Can Philippine policing be reclaimed?
Professionalism is just not restored by speeches. It requires structural insulation from political interference. It requires merit-based promotions. It requires a promotion system shielded from batchmate cliques and political patronage — points I’ve repeatedly raised. It requires retraining grounded in human rights, procedural justice, and evidence-based policing. It requires braveness from inside the ranks to say no to illegal orders.
Above all, it requires the Filipino folks to know that fast justice is usually no justice in any respect.
The demise of policing as a career didn’t occur in a vacuum. It was cheered. It was rationalized. It was framed as vital.
However killing as coverage is just not policing. It’s abdication.
The tragedy of August 15, 2017, was not merely that 32 lives have been misplaced in Bulacan. It was that, in that second, the state publicly celebrated demise as effectivity. And as soon as demise turns into efficiency, the career is already lifeless.
What stands earlier than us now is just not merely a authorized reckoning in a world courtroom. It’s a ethical reckoning at residence.
Will we rebuild policing as a career grounded in regulation, or will we once more be seduced by the applause that follows the gunshot?
That alternative, not like the bullets fired in 2017, continues to be ours. – Rappler.com
Raymund E. Narag, PhD, is an affiliate professor in criminology and legal justice on the Faculty of Justice and Public Security, Southern Illinois College, Carbondale.
https://weblog.passive-income4u.com/create-your-very-own-auto-publish-news-blog-site-and-earn-passive-income-in-just-4-easy-steps/
https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/pinoy-criminology-can-philippine-national-police-recover-from-duterte-drug-war/



