The hazard in BARMM’s first elections just isn’t the calendar. It’s the seize.
Congress has handed the invoice. September 2026 is the date for BARMM’s first parliamentary elections. Two Supreme Court docket petitions difficult BAA No. 86 — the redistricting regulation — stay pending, however the elections will nearly definitely proceed. The Court docket is not going to cease them.
The calendar debate is settled. The query that has not been requested loudly sufficient: who wins these elections, and what does that imply for the settlement supposed to finish this battle?
The redistricting context
BAA No. 86 issues as a result of district maps form outcomes. The Supreme Court docket struck down its predecessor, BAA No. 77, in September 2025 for particular constitutional violations. The BTA had till October 30, 2025 to provide a compliant substitute. They missed that deadline by two and a half months, and when BAA No. 86 lastly handed in a marathon session on January 13, 2026, it replicated the identical issues: Kapai grouped right into a non-contiguous Lanao del Sur district that already met the 100,000-person threshold with out it; a fifth district manufactured in Maguindanao del Norte from barangays that might not constitutionally help one; residents of Cotabato Metropolis barangays positioned in administrative limbo between metropolis jurisdiction and provincial parliamentary voting.
The petitioners are proper to problem these provisions. However even when the Court docket trims the worst configurations, the underlying intent — tilting the district map towards explicit political actors — can’t be absolutely undone by surgical authorized corrections.
Why the query of who wins is the query about peace.
The Bangsamoro battle didn’t come up from nothing. It arose from dispossession, from the systematic denial of the precise of the Moro folks to manipulate their very own lands and lives. The CAB exists to dismantle these constructions — particularly, operationally. Full implementation requires actors dedicated to it. Most of the conventional politicians positioning for September’s elections have been against the CAB. Their political pursuits align structurally in opposition to its implementation.
Begin with decommissioning. The MILF suspended it in July 2025, citing authorities failures on normalization. An estimated 14,000 combatants and a pair of,450 weapons stay exterior the method. MILF combatants is not going to permit themselves to be disarmed whereas conventional politicians — a lot of whom preserve their very own armed teams — retain their weapons and energy. Asking one aspect to put down arms whereas the opposite stays armed just isn’t normalization. It’s unilateral give up. A Bangsamoro parliament dominated by conventional politicians wouldn’t restore confidence within the normalization monitor. It will verify what the suspension already indicators: that the peace course of is being managed in opposition to the MILF, not with it.
The issue compounds whenever you take a look at land. A core factor of the CAB’s transitional justice framework considerations the historic dispossession of Bangsamoro communities — who took what, and whether or not it may be addressed. The TJRC Land Report is unsparing on this level: dispossession was not solely the work of Christian settlers and outdoors elites. Sure Moro leaders and elites additionally secured titles to massive tracts of land, actively engaged in land grabbing, and in some documented instances intentionally triggered rido — clan feuds — as devices of dispossession, utilizing horizontal battle to clear land and consolidate management. The institution of the ARMM compounded this by creating what the sources describe as a “new set of Moro elite” who accrued massive landholdings whereas holding political workplace. If September’s elections ship the Bangsamoro parliament to the identical class of conventional politicians, the BARMM will observe the identical script — producing not self-determination for Bangsamoro communities, however one other spherical of elite accumulation below a brand new institutional title. The politicians competing for seats in September usually are not impartial events to a reckoning about land. A transitional justice course of that reaches its supposed depth will implicate a few of them straight. They won’t fund the mechanisms, appoint the commissioners, or legislate the mandates {that a} real course of requires. These provisions can be staffed minimally and left to run out.
Beneath each failures is one thing extra basic. Conventional politicians in Mindanao have lengthy operated as brokers between their constituents and Manila — mediating entry to sources, contracts, and political favor in change for loyalty. Real autonomy threatens that mannequin. A Bangsamoro parliament that really workouts its fiscal and legislative powers — that negotiates with Manila as a companion quite than a supplicant — reduces the worth of the dealer operate. These politicians would quite govern as junior companions of Malacañang than combat for the self-determination the CAB promised. They’ve each structural incentive to protect dependence, not dismantle it.
What’s at stake on the bottom
The 2026 Bangsamoro funds is ₱114.7 billion. Inner income is lower than ₱500 million. In a area the place a long time of battle have left the personal sector skinny, the federal government is the financial system. Management of the regional parliament means management of contracts, employment, companies, alternative. When elections are that zero-sum, the factions that lose don’t concede and put together for the following cycle. They calculate whether or not the democratic path nonetheless serves them.
That is the sample that precedes relapse in post-conflict transitions. Elections held earlier than political agreements are stable don’t settle contests. They crystallize them.
What should occur earlier than September
The nationwide authorities, particularly OPAPRU, should keep out of the BARMM elections. Each credible sign of Manila’s choice for explicit candidates — by administrative selections or the path of public sources towards favored actors — delegitimizes the result earlier than the primary vote is forged. President Marcos should make this selection intentionally and visibly.
COMELEC should function with out political path. Its independence in BARMM just isn’t a procedural nicety. It’s the minimal situation for outcomes the shedding aspect accepts.
The usage of authorities sources within the marketing campaign should be actively constrained, not simply prohibited on paper. The hole between BARMM’s funds and its inner revenues makes the incumbent benefit structural. Worldwide companions ought to title this explicitly of their engagement.
IFIs, bilateral donors, and diplomatic missions invested on this peace course of ought to fund impartial election monitoring. They witnessed the CAB being signed. They’ve standing to insist that the elections implementing it are credible.
The closing query
The September 2026 elections will produce BARMM’s first parliament. Whether or not that parliament has the desire and the mandate to implement the CAB — or whether or not it turns into an establishment that manages the Bangsamoro whereas quietly shelving the settlement’s most transformative commitments — relies on who wins.
The Bangsamoro folks have waited since 2022 for this vote. They’re owed elections that resolve one thing actual about their future, not nearly who controls the funds.
(MindaViews is the opinion part of MindaNews. Camilo “Bong” Montesa of Cagayan de Oro is a lawyer and professor primarily based in Pasig Metropolis. He has spent three a long time in battle and peacebuilding work within the Philippines.)
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https://mindanews.com/mindaviews/2026/03/the-elections-are-confirmed-will-peace-survive-it/



